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Abstract
The paper provides consistent mathematical framework for seminal Tiebout
free-mobility model (1956). Our setting supports continuum of consumers
with multidimensional preferences and finite number of strategic public good
providers. We accommodate the most general assumptions: providers’ produc-
tion function may have variable returns to scale, our framework is rich enough
to incorporate possible externalities, spillovers, scale economies, network ef-
fects, etc.; consumers utility may depend on choice of other agents in almost
arbitrary way. We focus on equilibrium existence, however the questions of
efficiency and stability are not left behind. The model can also be applied in
several related fields, most notably in political economy.
Keywords. Tiebout sorting, local public goods, general equilibrium, group
formation, social interactions.
JEL Classification Numbers: D71, H20, H73.
∗Dmitri Pozarskiy University, MIPT and NES CSDSI, hibiny@mail.ru.
†NRU Higher School of Economics, and NES CSDSI, csorokin@hse.ru.
‡Southern Methodist University, and NES, sweber@mail.smu.edu.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
11
87
1v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  3
0 M
ay
 20
18
1 Introduction
Rigorous and consistent modeling of local public good economies has long been a
serious challenge for economists. Tiebout’s (1956) early conceptual thoughts still
aren’t structured into a fully fledged general equilibrium framework that can rival the
Arrow-Debreu model for private good economies and can be easily scaled from class-
room Edgeworth box tricks to computational general equilibrium models of national
economies. This paper aims at overcoming this issue.
It’s rather straightforward how to write down a local public good economy (LPGE)
model that allows free-mobility of agents, much harder is to provide its consistent
solution. There are three most prominent difficulties in modeling LPGE as compared
to classical private goods approach. First, on demand side, in LPGE we cannot
ignore externalities that agent’s choice imposes on everyone around him — having
good neighbors often turns to be crucial in residence choice; so the structure of agents’
preferences has to be much richer than in the private goods economies. Second, on
supply side, the public good production technology just can’t be imagined as having
exclusively decreasing or constant returns to scale — the cities are never built for one
resident, but for many; so productions sets are non-convex. Finally, the predictions
of cooperative and non-cooperative theories don’t coincide1 for LPGE as they do for
Arrow-Debreu model, where competitive equilibrium can be approximated with the
economy’s core; so even the right solution concept is unclear.
We provide a model which easily tackles the first two problems: agents can have
almost arbitrary preferences concerning the aggregate actions of others and public
good production technology can have various returns to scale. We prove the existence
of a non-cooperative (Nash, or, better, Tiebout-Nash) equilibrium, so that each agent
makes his best choice given what the others are doing. This result is in sharp contrast
with earlier findings of Dreze et al. (2008), which state that the LPGE core has to be
empty once we allow for multidimensional preferences. These two results combined
clearly give the upper hand to the non-cooperative approach, thus resolving the third
difficulty from the former paragraph. Our approach is related to Aumann’s work
(1964), where an assumption of a continuum of agents helps to attain much sharper
results on competitive equilibrium.
1This is the only non-obvious observation here, however, there is excessive literature clarifying
this issue, see, for example, discussion in Scotchmer (2002).
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We see our main contribution in separating the issues of equilibrium existence and
equilibrium efficiency in LPGE. We prove existence under much broader assumptions
than allow for efficiency, thus we identify the two potential causes of welfare losses:
externalities and wrong number of public good providers on market. Firstly, without
externalities we do prove the welfare theorem, however, with sufficiently strong exter-
nalities it is very easy to construct something like the tragedy of commons.2 As for
the second issue, we prove that the equilibrium exists for any number of active public
good providers on market, and nowadays it seems very naive to assume3 that the equi-
librium size of the community equals its socially optimal size.4 So we have to conclude
that the question of whether the free mobility improves welfare5 and to what extent
cannot be answered in a general theoretical model with realistic assumptions,6 and
indeed, this question recently attracted a lot of empirical attention, Ferreyra (2007)
and Banzhaf & Walsh (2008) are notable examples of these efforts, they have numer-
ous and impactful successors. Our work provides a unifying theoretical background
for such models.
The issues of potential inefficiency and equilibrium multiplicity leads us to the
questions of equilibrium stability. The results we obtain are striking: under very mild
assumptions every equilibrium is stable with respect to deviations of small groups
of similar agents. If we allow for deviations of arbitrary (i.e. diverse) small groups,
then the stability conditions become nontrivial. This at first site technical result has
important welfare implications: if the optimal community size changes (for example,
due to technological progress), then the old inefficient configuration may be persistent
as it takes either large or diverse group to create a snowball effect, both possibilities
might involve huge coordination problems.
Local public good interpretation is in the focus of our paper. However, the same
2This problem is well documented, see [5] for details.
3For example, if the public good provision market has free entry, then why at the optimal com-
munity size the profits of public good provider should be zero?
4Tiebout [17] actually did that in a most straightforward way by stating the following two as-
sumptions: (a) For every pattern of community services set by, say, a city manager who follows the
preferences of the older residents of the community, there is an optimal community size. This opti-
mum is defined in terms of the number of residents for which this bundle of services can be produced
at the lowest average cost. (b) Communities below the optimum size seek to attract new residents
to lower average costs. Those above optimum size do just the opposite. Those at an optimum try
to keep their populations constant.
5Let’s agree to call it Tiebout hypothesis.
6The famous critique by T. Bewley (1981) puts forth the same ideas: “If no more is true, then
Tiebout’s ideas lead not to a general theory but to a possibility which requires empirical verification.”
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mathematical approach can be applied to some very different setups, including spatial
political competition, club formation and even clustering.
To summarize, our main message can be summarized just in one line: We’ve found
the right framework, forget equilibrium existence problems in LPGE.
Literature Review
Since the 50-s this topic was revisited many times, some recent literature survey can
be found in Scotchmer (2002). Probably the first attempts to provide a consistent
mathematical framework for Tiebout choice model were done by Westhoff (1977) and
Greenberg and Weber (1985). The latter used cooperative game theory approach to
formalise their equilibrium concept, while the former relied on individual choice. De-
spite very fruitful contribution to unidimensional cooperative framework by Alesina
and Spolaore (1997), in subsequent research Dreze et al. (2008) have shown that
the core is always empty even in the simplest 2-dimensional setup. Other impor-
tant positive contributions in non-cooperative framework include a papers by Bewley
(1981) and Ellickson et al. (1999), however they do not allow for endogenous com-
munity characteristics, and thus are very limited compared to our setup. Musatov
et al. (2014) have proven noncooperative equilibrium existence for a very broad one-
dimensional class of models; but their results rely on some additional monotonicity
assumptions. We elaborate the same noncooperative approach and utilise similar
fixed-point techniques. However, one of our main contributions is exactly the de-
parture from unidimensional world, as it allowed to establish equilibrium existence
under very mild and most natural assumptions — at least as compared to the previous
literature.
Model Description and Results Preview
We consider a model with a continuum of agents and a finite number of public good
providers: each agent has to chose only one provider; for example, suppose that
a provider runs a neighborhood or a town, where an agent can choose to reside.7
Agent’s preferences can be fully described by his type, which is a vector of both dis-
crete (gender, ethnicity, education etc.) and real-valued variables (age, redistribution
7We can allow for a technical “provider” that stands for not making a choice and living alone in
the wild.
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preferences, etc.). There is a distribution over agent’s types, it should be non-atomic
in real-valued components.
Each community has a number of endogenous characteristics that depend con-
tinuously on the community composition; the most obvious one is community’s size,
others may include ethnic diversity or the median of redistribution preferences — any-
thing goes. To get better intuition of what community characteristics are the reader
might imagine themselves considering a job offer from another city — any aggregate
measure (welfare, health-care, crime, ecology, etc) important for that decision is a
community characteristic.8
The public good providers may adjust public good provision parameters maxi-
mizing their own utility or community’s welfare. The agent’s utility is integrable
with respect to his type and depends continuously on characteristics and public good
provision parameter of all communities — agents might take into account what’s go-
ing on in neighboring communities, thus our model allows for community spillovers,
network effects, trade, etc. Note that we do not need any concavity ar monotonicity
assumptions on the individual agent’s utility,9 continuity is enough. Also note that,
unlike our predecessors (Ellickson et. al (1999)) we do not have to model the pri-
vate good economy10 on top of a local public good one; with continuum of agents we
can balance things out with continuous group sizes and do not need divisible private
goods for that.
To obtain the equilibrium existence result we basically need one non-trivial as-
sumption: agents should have strict preferences. It is implying that for every pair
of communities, every possible community characteristics and public good provision
parameters the set of indifferent agents is small (i.e. has zero measure). We show
that this property holds generically in our setup.
We will also refer to this assumption as a hyperbola property. Its name comes out of
a very simple model, with its help we will demonstrate what exactly goes wrong if this
property fails. Consider agents having two-dimensional Euclidean metric preferences:
agent’s cost is proportional to the distance from their ideal point and that of the
8However, as agents compose a continuum, one cannot condition their utility on a fact that
another particular person lives in that community. This is a serious limitation, but a necessary one
in a continuous framework.
9Provider’s utility still has to be quasi-concave with respect to parameters of his choice, as there
are finite number of providers and we are looking for a Nash equilibrium.
10If needed, one can easily amend our model using the Aumann’s (1964) approach.
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community (centre). If providers charge constant prices for joining communities and
agents have quasilinear utility, then the set of indifferent agents would lie exactly on
a hyperbola: the difference of prices should equal the difference of distances, and a
hyperbola is exactly the locus of points where the absolute value of the difference
of the distances to the two foci is a constant. Hyperbola is a small subset of a 2-
dimensional space, but note that it is not the case in the unidimensional world, where
hyperbola could be a positive-measure interval. On the figure to the right it happens
when difference in prices exactly equals the difference between community centres;
otherwise, the set of indifferent agents is a single point or empty.
Figure 1: Sets of indifferent agents given
the difference of prices. Note the horizon-
tal line at ∆P = 2.
So the case of metric preferences on
a real line is a knife-edge situation where
the swings of large groups of indifferent
agents create discontinuities that under-
mine the equilibrium existence. Unfor-
tunately, exactly this story was a start-
ing point for too many earlier attempts
to prove a general existence theorem, see
Musatov et al. (2016) for details.11
If we go further and make one more
assumption — small group inefficiency
then the equilibrium with all the commu-
nities being non-empty also exists. Basi-
cally this condition implies that the ex-
penses of all the public good users go to
infinity as the size of their group goes to
zero. For example this is the case when
there is some small fixed cost that has
to be shared among public good users. This conditions also has a clear increasing
returns to scale interpretation — however we impose no further restrictions on agent
costs for larger groups. Note that this assumption perfectly fits the local public goods
story — living alone in an abandoned city is certainly a bad option.
11The strict preferences condition was used in a related field of matching theory by Azevedo and
Leshno (2013). Their results allow us to extend out theory (almost “as is”) to the case when the
communities have strict caps on their sizes and Gale-Shapley algorithm is used to allocate agents to
communities.
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This result is even more important than the former one because equilibrium exis-
tence is obvious once small group are inefficient — just pile everyone into one big city,
whatever the congestion costs are, they are still less than infinite costs of starting a
new city. This is why the existence of equilibrium with non-empty groups is nontrivial
and can’t be obtained by a straightforward application of a fixed-point theorem; we
rely on a refined set-intersection results to obtain the proof.
Our work parallels competitive equilibrium theory as agents and providers are
“price-takers” — their individual decisions do not change group sizes or any other
partition characteristics. The equilibrium is also Pareto-efficient with some rather
similar conditions12 — conditional on the exact number of non-empty communities.
But, us we already mentioned, the number of active communities need not be socially
optimal. For example, if running a community requires some fixed cost and there is
no side options for the agents, then the equilibrium expenses of all agents may be
arbitrary high just due to the large amount of communities and proportionally large
amount of fixed costs paid.13
To address the issue of “equilibrium” number of communities one needs to in-
troduce either a model of market entry and exit process, or some form of collective
decision making. First option is beyond the scope of this paper: the process of creat-
ing new communities is much more complicated than creating new firms. As for the
second option — the most natural way to introduce collective decision in our model
is to allow deviations by some small (but positive measure!) groups of agents and to
investigate equilibrium stability with respect to such deviations.
It turns out that in multidimensional case under minor technical assumptions any
equilibrium is weakly stable, i.e. there is no mutually profitable deviation by small -
ball of agents. However, the conditions for strong equilibrium stability — no mutually
profitable deviation by any small set of agents — are much more demanding. So if
equilibrium is weakly stable but not strongly then coordinated deviation of either
large group with similar preferences or small group with diverse preferences is needed
to do away with the equilibrium.
12In the general case efficiency may fail due to externalities and interaction effects, but note that
the first welfare theorem also fails if consumers care not only about their own consumption.
13Samuelson and Musgrave were afraid of a centralized public good under-provision due to free-
riding, but in LPGE we may end up with public good over-provision due to excessive fragmentation
of communities. And even private goods economy might have similar problems, as Dixit and Stiglitz
show for classical monopolistic competition model, where the free-entry condition leads to similar
problems.
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If we consider separable agent cost function including a component for distance
in preference space (horizontal differentiation) and a component for a share of fixed
cost (increasing returns to scale) then one important comparative statics result can
be obtained. As distance costs decrease relative to fixed costs any possible nontrivial
equilibria will sooner or later lose the strong stability property (if it had one). And
in the limit case with zero distance costs only trivial equilibrium with just one big
public good provider is stable. On the other hand, if there are no fixed costs then
any equilibrium is stable. Note that since all the equilibria remain weakly stable the
deviation of a group of agents with diverse preferences is required to go from more
smaller groups to fewer lager.
This statement has important efficiency implication: suppose that at some mo-
ment public good provision was efficient, however, since then the distance costs de-
creased.14 Then to maintain efficient public good provision the number of commu-
nities should decrease, but as stated above, any equilibrium is weakly stable; strong
stability failure allows to bring down an equilibrium by a coordinated deviation of
a set of agents with diverse preferences — but it may be very hard to execute just
because people with different preferences might just dislike each other. So it gives
rise to another potential source of inefficiency in local public good provision.
We proceed by laying down a formal model, first its simpler version (Section 2),
and next the extended case (Section 3). Next we will discuss welfare properties and
equilibria stability (Section 4).
2 Basic model
We begin with laying down a simplified version of our model, useful to explain its core
principle and derive several important comparative statics results. For now we allow
only for continuous component’s in agent’s type, community characteristics restricted
just to their sizes and no public good provision parameters. However spillovers and
externalities between communities are possible. So, consider a population of economic
agents distributed in k-dimensional vector space with a non-atomic compact-support
density. We need to partition them into n distinct communities such that no agent is
14In geographical setting this might be due to falling transportation costs, in political setting this
might be due to people becoming more tolerant.
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willing to migrate. The agent’s preferences are manifested in a cost function15 that
specifies expenses if they are willing to join any particular community. This cost
function depends on community’s index, agent’s type and on the share of agents in
each community.
Formally we consider the following setup. Agent’s preferences are fully charac-
terized by k real-valued parameters. These might be anything from his age to his
redistribution preferences, and we will refer to them as agent’s type. So let x be
a point in Rk, f(x) — non-atomic density function with support X. We assume
that X is compact and has nonempty interior. Let F (Y ) be measure of set Y ⊂ Rk
with respect to density f . Note that we neither need convexity of X nor make any
further assumptions about the properties of density, for example, it need not to be
continuous.
Let N = 1..n be a finite list of all available communities. Let ci(x,m) be a
function that stands for community i’s cost incurred to a person of type x should
community sizes be m. This function combines both agent idiosyncratic preferences
and communities’ public good provision technology — we do not have to treat them
separately.16 Define M = {m|mi > 0,
∑
imi = 1}. We assume that ci is continuous
in m ∈ M , measurable in x with respect to f and bounded from above (a.e.) in
x ∈ X and m−i for any given mi ∈ (0, 1), m ∈M .
The Tiebout-Nash equilibrium is a partition of X into n communities, I : X → N ,
such that each agent (each point in X) is as well off staying in his community as
joining any other given the choice of all other agents. Note that it implies that before
making their decisions all agents make conjectures about the actual community sizes
m, and in equilibrium their conjectures prove to be correct. As in general equilibrium
theory agents are “price-takers,” i.e. their individual decisions do not affect actual
community sizes.
The hyperbola property (strict preferences) assumption:
Assumption. For every two distinct communities i, j ∈ N and any community sizes
m ∈M the set of indifferent agents has zero measure, i.e.:
F ({x|ci(x,m) = cj(x,m)}) = 0.
15Following our predecessors [15] we will use (wlog) agent costs instead of their utilities.
16Once we will get to comparative statics we will separate them.
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Despite holding generically, this hyperbola property is restrictive. For example, it
is violated if X is one-dimensional interval and c is equal share tax plus distance to
community’s centre. We will consider this example in more detail later.
Our next assumption emphasizes that the public good provision technology usually
has increasing returns to scale. However, we restrict it only for small production
scales, for example, once the community size is large enough we allow for congestion
effects ti take over.
Assumption. As size of a community goes to zero, the costs of its dwellers go to
infinity uniformly in x:
∀A ∈ R+, ∃m0i ∈ R+ : ∀m ∈M : mi < m0i , ∀x ∈ X we have that ci(x,m) > A.
In other words communities of very small size have very high per-person costs —
this is a well-known small-group ineffectiveness. Note that this is a tricky assumption
as it might make the existence problem trivial — indeed, if there is only one large
group then no one would like to go into an empty one cause of infinite costs. So the
right question is whether the nontrivial equilibrium exists. The following theorem
addresses the issue.
Theorem 1 Under the assumptions above there exists an equilibrium such that all
N groups are non-empty.
There are two main intuitions behind this result. First, the hyperbola property
guarantees continuity that earlier one-dimensional models lacked. It is so simple
and elegant that we really were surprised to find out that it is actually sufficient for
equilibrium existence. Even more, in two dimensional case this condition is likely
to hold, as compared to the unidimensional preferences. Second, the small group
inefficiency allows to balance the groups such that each on is non-empty. For example,
if one group is more beneficial to agents then the other one (other things being equal),
then in equilibrium it is going to be small enough to offset this effect.
Another interpretation of the theorem is that there exists a partition such that
there is no snow-ball effect when one successful group incorporates the other one in
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a landsliding migration. However, this equilibrium may be non-stable — the next
section investigates this issue.
3 Extended model
This section provides the existence result under most general assumptions. We took
a lot of insight from empirical works and our idea is to incorporate everything that
matters in a real world into a single model.
Now suppose that there are q sets of types of agents,17 each has its own density
fj(xj) with compact support Xj ⊂ Rkj . Denote by f the product density and by X
— Cartesian product of supports. Let Fj(Yj) be measure of set Yj ⊂ Xj with respect
to density fj and F (Y ) =
∑q
j=1 Fj(Yj), Y = Y1 × ..× Yr ⊂ X.
Let there be li (Li = 1..li) characteristics {vil}l∈Li of community i on which agents’
utility may depend should she join this community. These parameters can stand
for almost anything from community’s total transportation cost to the measure of
community’s ethnic diversity. As a special (and necessary) case of parameters above
we take a share of each agent type (other than type 1) in each community. This way
mi will be total size of community i and the share of type 1 agents can be calculated
by subtracting from mi the total share of all other types.
Suppose that there for each community (i ∈ N) there are ri parameters zi that
public good providers are free to set the way they like. These can be public good
provision level, facility locations, fees, etc. Each provider seeks to maximise his
(or community’s) utility function ui(m, v, z) by choosing zi. We assume that ui is
continuous in all variables.
Each agent seeks to chose community that fits his preferences best. Let cji (x,m, v, z)
be a function that stands for community i’s cost incurred to a person of type j located
at x, should community sizes be m, communities’ characteristics — v, and public good
provision parameters — z. We assume that cji is measurable in x, continuous in all
other variables (m ∈M) and uniformly bounded from above in x ∈ X, m−i, v, z for
any given mi ∈ (0, 1), m ∈ M . As in the first section, we do not have to separate
here public good provision technology from agent’s idiosyncratic preferences.
After each agent had chosen his community we obtain a partition I : x → N
17Which might correspond to different ethnic groups, people of different sex and so on. Any
discrete characteristic spawns a finite number of sets of types.
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represented by an indicator function. With partition we can calculate community sizes
m and community characteristics v(I, z). We assume that community characteristics
depend continuously on partition with respect to symmetric difference measure metric
and that they depend continuously on public good provision parameters as well. For
example, this would be true if
vil =
∫
x∈X
H il (I(x), x)f(x)dx,
where Hl is just some (Lebesgue) integrable function in x.
Now we need to restate assumptions appropriately:
Assumption. For every two distinct communities i1, i2 ∈ N , any possible commu-
nity sizes m, community characteristics v and public good provision parameters — z
the total measure of sets of indifferent agents across types has zero measure, i.e.:
q∑
j=1
Fj({x|cji1(x,m, v, z) = cji2(x,m, v, z)}) = 0.
The small group inefficiency assumption remains almost as is:
Assumption. As size of community goes to zero its costs go to infinity:
cji (x,mi,m−i, v, z)→ +∞ as mi −→ 0.
In addition we need an assumption on the structure of set of possible community
characteristics:
Assumption. The set of all possible community characteristics V is homeomorphic
to l =
∑n
i=1 li dimensional cube.
18 From now on we will assume that this set is
actually a unit cube.
And also a standard assumption about the structure of a public good providers
game:
Assumption. For each community, the set of all possible public good provision
parameters Zi is compact and convex. Without generality loss we will take it as
18This assumption can be relaxed using sharper topological notions, but at a cost of exposition.
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r =
∑n
i=1 ri dimensional unit cube. The choice of provider may be restricted to some
nonempty compact convex subset Z¯i(m, v) ⊂ Zi given m and v. We will assume that
Z¯i(m, v)has closed graph in (m, v). Providers’ utility functions are quasi-concave with
respect to parameters of their choice.
A partition and a set of public good provision parameters is Tiebout equilibrium
if no agent is willing to change his community given community sizes, characteristics
and public good provision parameters; no provider is willing to modify his parameters
given his community.
The following theorem resembles our first theorem (1), however it is much more
general:
Theorem 2 Under the assumptions above there exists an equilibrium such that all
N groups are non-empty.
4 Efficiency and Stability
We begin this section by laying down a benchmark example that illustrates the key
trade-off of this model in the simplest way. Next, we will return to our model from
section 2 and state some general results for it.
Suppose that there is two dimensional preference space and some density with
compact convex support X (for example, unit circle). Any x ∈ X is an ideal point for
some consumers, their numbers are represented by a density function f(x). There are
N = 1..n public good providers, each has his own distinct “program” point xi, which
is constant. The Euclidean distance between public good provision “program” and
consumer’s ideal point is his idiosyncratic disutility from using that particular public
good. The public good production technology has zero marginal cost and constant
fixed cost g. The cost is distributed equally among everyone using that public good.
So, in this case we have
ci(x,mi) = ||x− xi||+ g
mi
.
Note that in this case all the key assumptions are satisfied as the set of indifferent
consumers is always a hyperbola — a zero-measure curve in two-dimensional space,
and small groups are inefficient because every consumer bears equal fixed cost share.
The existence theorem is non-trivial because there always is an equilibrium with just
one nonempty group.
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Stability analyses heavily relies on our ability to differentiate the cost functions,
so we have to make additional assumption regarding the model primitives. However,
the example above would help to keep things simple, as all the ideas below perfectly
apply to it.
For a general model of this section, we will assume that k = dim(X) is two or
greater, X is a convex set, function ci(x,m) does not depend on m−i, has continuous,
negative and bounded away from zero derivative in mi for all mi ∈ (0, 1); in addition,
these functions should have continuous derivative in x for all possible equilibrium
indifference points.19 We will also assume that for all such points (indifference between
groups i and j) ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂cj∂x − ∂ci∂x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > const > 0.
For strictly convex metric distance costs and equal share participation (as in the
example above) these assumptions are satisfied.
First we are going to establish an analog of the first welfare theorem. The key
assumption we need is that the cost function is separable, i.e. c(x,m) = cd(x)+ cs(m)
— exactly as the one in the example above.
Theorem 3 If agent’s cost function is separable, then every equilibrium is Pareto
optimal given the number of non-empty groups.
We need to make two comments here. First, without the separability condition the
result obviously fails as it’s very easy to construct prisoner’s dilemma-type external-
ities.20 Second, as equilibrium exists for any number of non-empty communities the
welfare of agents may change almost arbitrary with the number of active public good
providers; however, it’s clear that if there is a lot of providers on market and pub-
lic good provision requires a fixed cost then the equilibrium with fewer communities
might be better for all of the agents.
The possibility inefficient public good provision due to excessive number of com-
munities is one of the main motivations for studying equilibrium stability. We will
proceed by defining the weak stability notion.
Definition. An equilibrium is weakly stable if there exists  > 0 such that no subset
19Note that in case of distance costs in the example above center position is not a possible equi-
librium indifference point — otherwise that group would have zero size.
20Bewley (1981) is a good example here.
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of -ball (B) of agents can move from one group to another with a mutual benefit.
21
Small stability is the most natural way to describe a small deviation. The key
idea here that a small and closely-related group migrates from one community to
the other. Surprisingly, under the assumption above every equilibrium is stable with
respect to such deviations.
Theorem 4 Every equilibrium is weakly stable.
The intuition of this result is straightforward — suppose that a “diameter” of
this group is . Then the worst-case per-person distance losses are of the order of ,
while gains from scale economy are of the k order with k > 1. Not surprisingly, for
sufficiently small epsilon one is always greater than another. The following definition
of strong stability removes the group diameter constraint, so that stability conditions
become non-trivial.
Definition. An equilibrium is strongly stable if there exists  > 0 such that no set
of agents with measure  can move from one group to another to a mutual benefit.
Theorem 5 If in an equilibrium for all n− 1 dimensional measurable subsets Tij of
group borders (Brdij) there exists an agent y ∈ Tij such that the following holds:∫
Tij
f(x)∣∣∣∣∣∣∂cj∂x − ∂ci∂x ∣∣∣∣∣∣dw +
1
∂cj(y,mj)
∂mj
< 0.
then that equilibrium is strongly stable.
Remark 1 The scale gains
∂cj(y,mj)
∂m
do depend on y in the general case, so we have
to consider all possible deviating sets, as it may be that some agents on the border
benefit from scale economy greater than the others. However, if the cost function is
separable in group sizes and distances then the theorem above becomes much simpler.
Because
∂cj(y,mj)
∂mj
does not depend on y we should take the largest deviating set possible
— the whole border: Tij = Brdij.
Our definitions of stability were designed to illustrate the nature of deviations
that may cause snowballing migration that would result in significant changes in the
21For exposition reasons we only consider bilateral stability here, our notions and results can be
trivially generalized to a multilateral case
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equilibrium structure. The results indicate that either the deviating group should be
large or it has to consist of agents with diverse preferences. One way or another, that
deviation may be hard to execute, either because of coordination problem in large
groups or cause of internal conflict in small but diverse ones.
The conditions for strong stability may seem rather complicated, however, they
still might help to estabish a key comparative statics result of the paper. Let’s suppose
that the distance costs are decreasing, then the strong stability would sooner or later
disappear.
Theorem 6 If
∂cj
∂m
is uniformly bounded away from zero for all equilibrium partitions,
then as
∂cj
∂x
→ 0 any nontrivial equilibrium becomes non strongly stable, however, it
remains weakly stable. On the other hand, if ||∂cj
∂x
− ∂ci
∂x
|| is uniformly bounded away
from zero in all possible equilibrium indifference points, then as
∂cj
∂m
→ 0 any nontrivial
equilibrium becomes strongly stable.
We might consider extreme cases here: suppose that there are no distance costs,
then every equilibrium is not stable as there is nothing to offset gains from the scale
economy. On the other hand, if there is no scale economy effects then every equilibri-
ums is stable, as there is nothing to gain by migrating to another group — every agent
already gets his best option. The result above establishes that situation remains the
same if we are sufficiently close to these extreme situations.
Note however, that even in the simplest example mentioned above there might
be several equilibria, with some of them being stable and some not. Our numerical
simulations indicate that the “gray zone” of parameters with mixed effects possible
is rather large.
5 Discussion
It’s worthwhile stressing once again the key message of our research. We managed to
separate to main issues with Tiebout-type models: the issue of model consistency and
the issue of equilibrium efficiency. The theorem above actually closes the first issue —
the equilibrium exists under very mild and reasonable assumptions, which are more or
less standard to classical economic theory. Moreover, our setup is estimation-friendly,
as it incorporates into existence framework almost everything that applied researcher
might want to take into account.
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The equilibrium efficiency is much more ambiguous as our research suggests: it
might be undermined in many different ways — from wrong number of public good
providers on market to complex externalities among communities. Therefore, we
would like to rephare the original Tiebout message as the “Tiebout hypotheses:”
Free mobility improves social welfare.
In reality might be true or false, depending on the studied situation. And we stress
that only empirical research that takes into account all the particular details can
really answer that question, and that answer is necessary setting-specific.
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Appendix
Proof of theorem 1.
Take Me to be -restricted (1/n >  > 0) simplex:
Me = {m|mi ≥ ,
n∑
i=1
mi = 1.}
We will refer to m ∈ Me as nominal group sizes. Given the nominal sizes we can
form communities (partition I : X → N) and measure their real sizes:
Si(m) = {x|x ∈ Argmin
i∈N
ci(x,m)}, fi(m) = F (Si(m)), (i ∈ N).
Clearly, if fi = mi we’ve found an equilibrium partition. To proceed further we need
the following claims:
Claim 1 f(m) is continuous on Me.
Proof of claim 1.
This result directly follows from the dominated convergence theorem. Indeed,
consider a converging sequence of group sizes {ml}l∈N → m and construct a sequence
of corresponding partitions Il(x). Due to the hyperbola property assumption the
sequence Il(x) of indicator functions converges almost everywhere to the partition
I(x) corresponding to the limit nominal group sizes m. The indicator functions are
trivially uniformly bounded from above, so by dominated convergence theorem we
have the convergence of group sizes: fi(ml)→ fi(m).
Claim 2 There exists  > 0 such that
mi ≤ ⇒ fi(m) = 0, (i ∈ N).
Proof of claim 2.
First recall that due to small group inefficiency ci(x,m
j
i ,m−i)→ +∞ as mji −−−−→
j→+∞
0. By taking the upper bound of costs for all agents in X and all the communities:
we obtain the cost that should be superseded via taking sufficiently small . Denote
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M−ie = {m|mi ≥ ,
∑
i∈N−imi = 1− }.
inf
i∈N, x∈X,m−i∈M−ie
(ci(x, ,m−i)) > sup
m∈Me, x∈X
[
inf
j∈N
{(cj(x,m))}
]
.
Since for every m ∈Me at least one community has size above 1/n all the supremums
and infimums above are well-defined due to uniform boundless assumption. Thus we
are done.
Now the road is short — define the following sets:
Ai = {m ∈M |fi(m) ≥ mi}, (i ∈ N).
Observe that all these sets are closed due to claim 1. Since
∑
i fi =
∑
imi = 1 (due to
regularity assumption) their union covers Me. Now take any I ⊂ N and consider face
of simplex M spanned by vertices from I: any community j not in I has  nominal
mass and zero real mass on that face due to claim 2. Therefore m on face I does not
belong to any set Aj, j /∈ I, so face I is covered by ∪i∈IAi. Now observe that the
intersection of Ai, (i ∈ N) is the equilibrium we seek. Indeed
∀i ∈ N : fi ≥ mi and
∑
i
fi =
∑
i
mi = 1⇒ fi = mi.
But such intersection exists due to the celebrated Knaster–Kuratowski–Mazurkiewicz
lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose that a simplex ∆m is covered by the closed sets Ci for i ∈ I =
{1, . . . ,m} and that for all Ik ⊂ I the face of ∆m that is spanned by ei for i ∈ Ik is
covered by Ci for i ∈ Ik then all the Ci have a common intersection point.
Proof of theorem 4.
Take an equilibrium partition and then pick an agent x0 ∈ X such that she is
indifferent between joining groups i and j, i.e.: ci(x
0,mi) = cj(x
0,mj). Due to our
assumptions the sets containing such agent are the only candidates for profitable
deviation; if some compact set contains only agents that strictly prefer one group
over the other, then we can find such small  that every -ball subset of the that
set would be still strictly better of staying in original group then joining any other
(possible gains are proportional to dmi ∼ k).
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Note that in our setup the gains of a deviating group originate from “scale econ-
omy” and depend on group size m, while the losses are always due to “distance
costs” and depend on location x. Otherwise it is not an equilibrium partition: a
single deviating point does not change group sizes — so no “distance gains.”
Now assume that each agent in some small group V is ready to take an additional
cost dγ in attempt to move from group i to another group j. We can easily find the
distance dx from indifferent agent x that implies such cost:
dγ =
(
∂cj
∂x
− ∂ci
∂x
)
dx
Note that the border between groups i and j is given by the equation
ci(x,mi) = cj(x,mj)⇔ cj(x,mj)− ci(x,mi) = 0,
so vector ∂cj/∂x− ∂ci/∂x is normal to the border. To find the most distant agent that
pays cost no more than dγ we take dx proportional to ∂cj/∂x − ∂ci/∂x and denote
dh = ||dx||.
Now we need to find a subset V of an -ball around x0 such that: (a) every agent
is in group i, (b) each agent suffers costs no more than dγ. Let f 0 denote the density
in x0 and W — (k − 1)-dimensional ball containing x0, subset of B. Then, by
evaluating the size of V from above (up to a linearisation in dx) we have:
dmV = V ol(W) ∗ f 0 ∗ dh.
For the deviation to be non-profitable the costs of the most hurt agent should exceed
his benefits, i.e.:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂cj∂x − ∂ci∂x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ dh > −∂cj∂mdmV ⇔
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂cj∂x − ∂ci∂x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > −f 0 ∂cj∂mV ol(W)
Due to our assumptions ‖|∂cj/∂x− ∂ci/∂x|| is bounded away from 0, f 0 is just bounded,
W can be taken arbitrary small, and the only thing that remains is to show that
∂cj
∂m
is bounded for all equilibrium partitions22.
To prove it note that as we have stated in the theorem 1 proof each group has a
22Due to small group inefficiency assumption it is clearly unbounded if we consider all the feasible
partitions
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technically minimum equilibrium size and this size is non-zero (Claim 2). By our as-
sumption the cost function is smooth, so its derivative is continuous and it is bounded
on any compact subset of M (recall that M itself is an open simplex).
Proof of theorem 5.
The result can be obtained by integrating the key inequality of theorem 4 proof.
Exactly, assume that the deviating agents agree to to take an additional cost dγ.
Then for each agent x on the border of groups i and j we can convert this cost into
distance from border dh:
dγ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂cj∂x − ∂ci∂x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ dh
Now we can take a border subset Tij ⊂ Brdij and obtain the corresponding size of a
deviating group:
dmTij = dγ
∫
Tij
f(x)dw∣∣∣∣∣∣∂cj∂x − ∂ci∂x ∣∣∣∣∣∣.
For the deviation to be non-profitable there should be at least one agent y in a
deviating group who doesn’t like the idea, i.e. his distance costs are not compensated
by scale gains:
dγ > −∂cj(y,mj)
∂m
dmTij = −
∂cj(y,mj)
∂m
dγ
∫
Tij
f(x)dw∣∣∣∣∣∣∂cj∂x − ∂ci∂x ∣∣∣∣∣∣.
After simplification we obtain the needed expression:∫
Tij
f(x)∣∣∣∣∣∣∂cj∂x − ∂ci∂x ∣∣∣∣∣∣dw +
1
∂cj(y,mj)
∂mj
< 0.
Thus we are done.
Proof of theorem 6.
The second part of the theorem’s first claim is a direct implication of theorem 4.
The other claims obviously follow from theorem 5, indeed, the conditions for strong
stability are: ∫
Tij
f(x)∣∣∣∣∣∣∂cj∂x − ∂ci∂x ∣∣∣∣∣∣dw +
1
∂cj(y,mj)
∂mj
< 0.
In both cases one term goes to infinity while the other remains bounded from above.
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Note that due to our assumptions (existence of derivatives) the measure of any border
remains finite.
Proof of theorem 3.
The proof is very straightforward: take one agent from each group that benefits
best (i.e. has the lowest cd component value). Take any other partition — we claim
that at least one of them is worse off if group sizes change. Indeed, since the utility
of an agent strictly decreases with the size of his group (small group inefficiency plus
derivative is bounded away from zero) and the sum of group sizes remains constant
with any other group sizes at least one of them would be worse off should their group
assignment remain the same. But the latter is always the case — if the agent who is
best positioned for some group is willing to leave it then this group should be empty.
We can finish the proof by pointing out that all the agents make optimal decisions
given group sizes — therefore the utility of other agents cannot be improved without
changing the sizes.
Proof of theorem 2.
The proof follows the lines of Theorem’s 1 proof. The only difference is that
we have to take a more general version of KKM lemma, since we no longer have
one simplex but a product of simplexes (a n-dimensional cube is a product of n
1-dimensional simplexes). Indeed, take  > 0, constrained group size simplex Me
and some nominal sizes, characteristics and parameters (m, v, z) ∈ Me × V × Z,
z ∈ Z¯(m, v). With the help of the variables above we can construct a partition
I[m, v, z](x) such that every agent makes optimal choice given (m, v, z). Now we
calculate real values of group sizes and characteristics:
Sji (m, v, z) = {x|I[m, v, z](x) = i} = {x|x ∈ Argmin
i∈N
cji (x,m, v, z)},
fmij (m, v, z) = Fi(S
j
i (m, v, z)), f
v
il(m, v, z) = v
i
l(I[m, v, z], z).
Next we calculate providers’ best responses to fmij (m, v, z) and f
v
il(m, v, z):
f ri (m, v, z) = Arg max
z¯i∈Z¯i(fm,fv)
u(fm, f v, z¯i, z−i)
Claim 3 fm(m, v, z) and f v(m, v, z) are continuous on Me× V ×Z, f r(m, v, z) has
close graph and is convex-valued.
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Proof of claim 3.
The first part of the proof is a direct generalisation of claim’s 1 proof, the second
one is standard lemma used to prove Nash equilibrium existence in game theory.
Claim 4 There exists  > 0 such that ∀m−i, v, z
mi ≤ ⇒ fmi (m, v, z) = 0, (i ∈ N).
Proof of claim 4.
The proof directly repeats claim’s 2 proof.
Now we need to modify the construction of theorem’s 1 proof to make use of KKM
product lemma. We will use dual covering lemma from Freund (1986) (covering lemma
2). Let Tα be a standard α-dimensional simplex, T = Tα1× ...×Tαβ be a simplitope,
i.e. product of β simplexes. Let Γ = {(j, k)|j ∈ {1..β}, k ∈ {1..αj}} be a set of
indexes. We have the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Let T jk, (j, k) ∈ Γ, be a family of closed sets such that ∪(j,k)∈NT jk = S,
and T jk ⊃ {t ∈ T |tjk = 0} for each (j, k) ∈ Γ. Then there exists j ∈ {1, ..., α} such
that ∩k=1..mjT jk 6= ∅.
If there is just one simplex it is just Scarf’s dual KKM lemma.
In our case simplex T would be a product of Me, V and Z, thus we have a product
of n− 1 dimensional simplex and r+ l 1 dimensional simplexes (recall that V and Z
are cubes). Now we are ready to define the set that cover T = Me× V ×Z. In order
to maintain standard simplicial structure let’s reindex the variables in the following
way: t = (m, v, z), t1i = mi, t
j
1 = v
i
p, t
j
2 = 1− vip, tj1 = ziq, tj2 = 1− ziq; j = 2..1 + l + r.
Here j changes along with i, p and q to maintain continuous numbering. Denote by
Γ the set of all such indexes. Slightly abusing notation we will use f correspondence
as it was defined on T using appropriate indexation. We define f j2 (t) = 1 − f j1 (t).
Denote by f
j
k(t) = min f
j
k(t) (recall that f is a correspondence in some variables).
Now we a ready to define the covering sets:
Ajk = {t ∈ T |f
j
k(t)− tjk ≥ f
p
q(t)− tpq , ∀(p, q) ∈ Γ}∪
{t ∈ T |tjk = 0, if j = 2..1 + l + r} ∪ {t ∈ T |tjk = , if j = 1}.
Due to regularity assumption their union covers M . Observe that all these sets
are closed due to claim 3.
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Thus due to lemma 2 there exists j ∈ {1, ..., α} such that ∩k=1..mjT jk 6= ∅ —
other assumptions are satisfied by construction. We claim that t ∈ ∩k=1..mjT jk is the
equilibrium we seek. Indeed, due to continuity (closeness) and convexity we obtain
that t ∈ f(t), moreover, this point cannot lie on the boundary of first simplex (group
sizes) due to lemma 4 — the argumentation for it is the same as in theorem’s 1 proof.
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